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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-CRIME MAY
PAY: NEW YORK'S SON OF SAM LAW FOUND UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Si-
mon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S.
Ct. 501 (1991).
I. FACTS
In 1980, Henry Hill was arrested and charged with conspiring to
sell drugs.1 In exchange for immunity from prosecution, Hill agreed to
assist the Government and testify against several of his former col-
leagues.' As a result, Hill was placed in the Federal Witness Protection
Program.'
In 1981, Simon & Schuster contacted Hill about publishing a
book that would focus on organized crime in New York City." The
Sterling Lord Agency ("Sterling Lord"), a New York literary agency,
was hired by Simon & Schuster to find an author to write the book. 5
Sterling Lord was able to obtain the services of a well-known author,
Nicholas Pileggi.6 On September 1, 1981, a publishing agreement was
entered into between Simon & Schuster, Pileggi, and Hill.7 Under the
1. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170, 172
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
2. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 506
(1991).
3. Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 172.
4. Id. Simon & Schuster, a well-known publishing company located in New York City,
began talks with Hill after learning that he had authorized his attorney to "sell his story for
publication." Karen M. Ecker & Margot J. O'Brien, Note, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti:
Can New York's Son of Sam Law Survive First Amendment Challenge?, 66 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1075, 1079 (1991). "The idea of the book was to demonstrate the pedestrian activities of a
low-level member of a criminal enterprise and to dispel commonly-held romantic notions about life
in a crime 'family.' " Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 779 (2nd Cir. 1990).
5. Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 172.
6. Id. Nicholas Pileggi was well known for several articles that he had previously written on
organized crime. Id.
7. Id.
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terms of the agreement, Simon & Schuster was obligated to make pay-
ments to Sterling Lord who in turn was to divide the money between
Hill and Pileggi.8 Sterling Lord was to retain ten percent of the money
as its compensation.9 At the time of the agreement, there seemed to be
no indication that Hill would have agreed to publish the book absent
the understanding that he would be paid for his efforts.10 The result of
Hill and Pileggi's collaboration was Wiseguy. Life in a Mafia Family,11
which was published in January of 1986.12 In 1990, the movie Good-
Fellas13 was created from Pileggi's novel.' 4
In January of 1986, the New York State Crime Victims Board
("Board"), pursuant to section 632-a of the Executive Law, 5 directed
Simon & Schuster to provide the Board with copies of all agreements
between Hill and Simon & Schuster.'" In its reply letter, Simon &
Schuster provided the Board with "the dates and amounts of pay-
ments" to the Sterling Lord Agency for Hill's account. 17 At the
Board's request, further payments to Hill were suspended.'"
The Board served Simon & Schuster with a Proposed Determina-
tion and Order on June 15, 1987.1' The Board ordered Hill to relin-
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 779 (2nd Cir. 1990).
11. NICHOLAS PILEGGI. WISEGUY: LIFE IN A MAFIA FAMILY (1986). The book was very
successful. According to Simon & Schuster, over one million copies of the soft cover edition and
over 90,000 copies of the book in its trade edition have been sold. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 779.
12. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 779. WISEGUY described several highly
celebrated crimes in which Hill had been involved including the "theft of nearly six million dollars
in cash and jewelry from the Lufthansa terminal at Kennedy airport and the bribery of Boston
College basketball players." Id. Hill was not prosecuted for all the crimes to which he admitted in
his book. Many of the victims of Hill's criminal sprees were identified in WISEGUY. Id.
13. GOODFELLAS (Warner Bros. 1990).
14. Ecker & O'Brien, supro note 4, at 1080.
15. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992). This law is often referred to
as the "Son of Sam" law. See infra note 41. Generally, this law provides that "profits derived by a
criminal from the exploitation of his or her crime be deposited as earned in an escrow account
maintained by the Victims Board as a means of preserving funds for the satisfaction of civil judg-
ments later recovered by the victims of the exploited crimes." Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti,
916 F.2d at 778.
16. 916 F.2d at 780.
17. Id. Simon & Schuster's reply letter revealed that the total amount of payments to Hill
was $96,250. Also enclosed with the reply letter were copies of agreements between the parties
and copies of two agreements providing for the extension of the manuscript delivery dates. Id.
18. Id.
19. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170, 172
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). The order informed Simon & Schuster that they had a right to a hearing. No
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quish all the money he had received to date, plus interest, less commis-
sions paid to Sterling Lord.2" Simon & Schuster was ordered to
transfer to the Board all moneys payable to Hill plus all future royal-
ties.21 In addition, if Hill failed to turn over the money to the Board,
Simon & Schuster would be held liable to the Board for any money
"wrongfully distributed to Hill."22 The Board also determined that
payments made to Nicholas Pileggi, the author, were not subject to
section 632-a.23 The agent, Sterling Lord, was permitted to keep its ten
percent literary fee.2 4
On August 3, 1987, Simon & Schuster brought an action against
the members of the New York State Crime Victims Board seeking an
order declaring that section 632-a of New York's Executive Law vio-
lated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.25 The district court found
no First Amendment violation upon concluding that section 632-a did
not directly affect expressive activity.2
6
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that the statute im-
posed a content-based restriction on speech.27 The court held that the
hearing was requested and a final order was issued on July 15, 1987. Id. "The order concluded
that WISEGUY was subject to the regulations promulgated in § 632-a, because the book contained
Hill's thoughts, feelings, opinions and emotions about and admissions to his participation in crimi-
nal activities." Id. at 172.
20. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 780.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Ecker & O'Brien, supra note 4, at 1080.
25. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 780. This action was brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) to enforce the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Id.
Simon & Schuster argued that § 632-a violated the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of
speech. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 724 F. Supp. 170, 173
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). Furthermore, Simon & Schuster argued that § 632-a was overbroad and vague
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Simon & Schuster also sought an injunction
prohibiting the Board from taking any steps to enforce the statute. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777, 780 (2nd Cir. 1990). Attorney's fees were also sought under 42 U.S.C. §
1988 (1982). Id.
26. Simon & Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 178. The district court found that the statute was
directed at regulating the proceeds of the contract, a nonspeech activity. Id. at 179. Therefore, the
court held that the state's interest in compensating crime victims was important enough to allow
incidental burdens on the freedom of speech. Id. Simon & Schuster's Fourteenth Amendment
claim that the statute was overbroad and vague was also rejected by the court. Id. at 180. The
court concluded that § 632-a provided fair notice, provided adequate guidelines for the Board to
follow, and did not burden Simon & Schuster's "basic constitutional freedoms." Simon &
Schuster, 724 F. Supp. at 180. Simon & Schuster did not advance the Fourteenth Amendment
claim on appeal. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d at 781.
27. 916 F.2d at 781-82. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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statute survived strict scrutiny since it was narrowly tailored to accom-
plish the state's compelling interest in "denying criminals any gain
from the stories of their crimes until the victims of those crimes are
fully compensated for all losses arising out of their victimization. ' 28 As
a result, the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of section
632-a.29
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" ° to determine whether sec-
tion 632-a of New York's Executive Law was inconsistent with the
First Amendment's protection of free expression.3 1 The Court agreed
with the Second Circuit that the statute imposed a financial burden on
speakers based on the content of their speech 32 and thus, the appropri-
ate standard of review was strict scrutiny. 3 However, the Court dis-
agreed with the Second Circuit's application of this standard. 3 The
Court ultimately concluded that the State of New York had a legiti-
mate interest in compensating victims of crime but that the Son of Sam
law was not narrowly tailored to advance this interest. 35 Therefore, the
Court declared New York's Son of Sam law unconstitutional.36 Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501
(1991).
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The underlying policy concerns relating to New York's Son of
Sam law can be traced back to Riggs v. Palmer,37 where the New York
Court of Appeals recognized the common law principle that no person
should be allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing. 8 Almost eighty
28. Id. at 783.
29. Id. at 784.
30. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub
nom. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., III S. Ct. 950 (1991).
31. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508
(1991 ). The Court was compelled to grant certiorari because several states and the federal govern-
ment have enacted legislation similar to New York's Son of Sam law. See infra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text.
32. Id. at 508.
33. Id. at 508-12.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 511-12.
36. Id. at 512.
37. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
38. Id. at 190. In Riggs, the New York Court of Appeals stated: "No one shall be permit-
ted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong. . . .These maxims are
dictated by public policy, have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized coun-
tries, and have nowhere been superseded by statutes." Id.
676 [Vol. 14:673
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years later, the New York Legislature enacted Article 22 of the Execu-
tive Law. 39 The purpose of Article 22 was to provide governmental fi-
nancial assistance to victims of crime.4" Section 632-a was added in
1977.41 Under section 632-a, proceeds earned by a criminal are redi-
39. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 620-35 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992). Article 22 is entitled
"Crime Victims Board." This section was enacted in the wake of the stabbing death of Arthur F.
Collins. Collins was stabbed to death on October 9, 1965, after attempting to protect several
elderly women from a drunk man on the subway. Patricia N. Gillard, Comment, The Expansion
of Victim Compensation Programs: Today's "Son of Sam" Legislation and its Susceptibility to
Constitutional Challenge, 18 U TOL. L. REV. 155, 158 n.20 (1986).
40. Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 414 N.Y.S.2d 350, 352 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). Section 620 states
that "many innocent persons suffer personal physical injury or death as a result of criminal acts"
and that "there is a need for government financial assistance for such victims of crime. Accord-
ingly, it is the legislature's intent that aid, care and support be provided by the state, as a matter
of grace, for such victims of crime." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 620 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992).
41. N.Y EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992). This section is entitled "Dis-
tribution of moneys received as a result of the commission of crime." Id. Section 632-a was en-
acted in response to the notorious "Son of Sam" killer, David Berkowitz, who terrorized New
York City with his random killings of young women and their escorts. Sue S. Okuda, Comment,
Criminal Antiprofit Laws: Some Thoughts in Favor of Their Constitutionality, 76 CALIF. L. REV.
1353, 1354-55 (1988). "McGraw-Hill Book Company later bought the rights to Berkowitz's [Son
of Sam] story in a deal that included a $250,000 advance, $150,000 profit to the ghost writer, [10
percent to the literary agent] and $75,000 to Berkowitz through his court-appointed conservator
Doris Johnsen." Id. at 1354. Oddly enough, the Son of Sam law was never applied to Berkowitz's
profits. Ecker and O'Brien, supra note 4, at 1077 n.12. The statute, when originally enacted, only
pertained to convicted criminals and Berkowitz was declared mentally incompetent to stand trial.
Dennis Hevesi, Cases Under "Sam" Law: Notorious but Few, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1991, at B8.
Thus, these statutes have been referred to as Son of Sam laws. The purpose of the New York
legislation was summarized in a memorandum by the bill's sponsor, Senator Emanuel R. Gold,
who stated:
It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that an individual, such as the
forty-four caliber killer [David Berkowitz], can expect to receive large sums of money
for his story once he is captured - while five people are dead, other people were in-
jured as a result of his conduct. This bill would make it clear that in all criminal situa-
tions, the victim must be more important than the criminal.
Ecker & O'Brien, supra note 4, at 1077 n.12.
Section 632-a provides, in relevant part:
1. Every person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other legal entity con-
tracting with any person or the representative or assignee of any person, accused or
convicted of a crime in this state, with respect to the reenactment of such crime, by way
of a movie, book, magazine article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio or televi-
sion presentation, live entertainment of any kind, or from the expression of such ac-
cused or convicted person's thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions regarding such
crime, shall submit a copy of such contract to the board and pay over to the board any
moneys which would otherwise, by terms of such contract, be owing to the person so
accused or convicted or his representatives. The board shall deposit such moneys in an
escrow account for the benefit of and payable to any victim or the legal repressentative
of any victim of crimes committed by: (i) such convicted person; or (ii) by such accused
person, but only if.such accused person is eventually convicted of the crime and pro-
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:673
rected so that they are used to compensate the victims of their crime."2
Since its enactment in 1977, section 632-a has been amended several
times in an effort to strengthen its scope, expand its coverage, and set
forth the priorities for payment of the monies held in escrow. 3 Most
state legislatures44 and the federal government45 have followed New
York's lead and enacted similar Son of Sam legislation.
Section 632-a requires that any legal entity46 that contracts with a
criminal 7 regarding the re-enactment or discussion 8 of a crime that
was committed by the criminal must submit a copy of the contract,
together with any money owed to the criminal under the contract, to
the New York State Crime Victims Board. 9 The Board holds this
money in an escrow account for five years, and during that time the
crime victim or the crime victim's estate can bring a civil lawsuit
against the criminal.50 The statute requires the Board to publicize the
availability of the money to satisfy any judgments received by victims
of the crime.51 Once these judgments are satisfied, the money is then
vided that such victim, within five years of the date of the establishment of such escrow
account, brings a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction and recovers a money
judgment for damages against such person or his representatives.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992).
42. Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
43. See Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 823; Act of Sept. 1, 1978, ch. 417; Act of July 7, 1981,
ch. 445; and Act of May 12, 1986, ch. 74 (codified as amended at N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a
(1986)).
44. Brief for Respondent at 13 n.16, Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (No. 90-1059). According to the Respondent's Brief, 42 states
have enacted legislation similar to New York's Son of Sam law. Id. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-90-308 (Michie 1987).
45. 18 U.S.C §§ 3681-82 (1990).
46. The statute applies to "[elvery person, firm, corporation, partnership, association or
other legal entity" that contracts with a criminal or the representative or assignee of a criminal.
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992).
47. A criminal is defined to include a person convicted of a crime committed in New York
as well as any person who voluntarily and intelligently admits committing a crime. N.Y. EXEC.
LAW § 632-a(10)(b).
48. The statute applies to the re-enactment of a crime "by way of a movie, book, magazine
article, tape recording, phonograph record, radio or television presentation, live entertainment of
any kind," or from the expression of the criminal's "thoughts, feelings, opinions or emotions re-
garding such crime." N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1).
49. Id. The New York Crime Victims Board is an executive agency charged with enforcing
the statute. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 623 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992).
50. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l). The regular statute of limitations for a tort or wrongful
death action does not bar these suits. Section 632-a creates its own cause of action with its own
five year statute of limitations that begins to run when the escrow account is established. N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 632-a(7).
51. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(2).
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made available to satisfy any other judgment creditors.5" Claims on the
escrow account are satisfied in accordance with the priorities set forth
in the statute.5"
Prior to Simon & Schuster, the Supreme Court had not had an
occasion to rule on the constitutionality of the Son'of Sam laws. How-
ever, two state courts had considered the issue.54 Although different
52. See generally N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(ll1)(a-e). Section 632-a(9) prohibits criminals
from attempting to transfer their legal interest in the profits. See Children of Bedford, Inc. v.
Petrometis, 573 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1991) (invalidating an attempt by Jean Harris, the woman
convicted of murdering the "Scarsdale Diet" doctor, to assign a portion of her profits from the
book STRANGER IN Two WORLDS to a foundation that she had helped establish).
53. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l 1). The priorities are set up to ensure that the victims are
paid before the criminal or other judgment creditors. However, a small percentage of the money in
the escrow account is available to the criminal to pay legal fees in his criminal case. Furthermore,
the state is entitled to be reimbursed for any money it paid the victims and the representative who
assisted the criminal in producing the work is entitled to be compensated. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-
a(8), (11). Several cases have already come before the Board for review. E.g., (1) Mark David
Chapman, the man who killed John Lennon, received $8,626 for allowing a magazine to interview
him. These funds are currently being held in escrow. (2) $15,818 has been collected from Jack
Henry Abbott after authoring two books. Abbott was convicted of murder for stabbing a young
actor to death in 1981. (3) R. Foster Winans wrote a book about his conviction for insider trading.
The Board is currently holding $20,029 of Winans' money. (4) The only case in which any victims
were paid involved John Wojtowicz, the bank robber, who was portrayed in the movie DOG DAY
AFTERNOON. The Board collected $75,062. Of that, approximately $71,000 has been paid out.
The Board has collected an additional $14,411 from continued showings of the movie. (5) Jean
Harris, convicted of killing the famed "Scarsdale Diet" doctor, Dr. Herman Tarnower, wrote a
.book detailing this murder. This case is currently being adjudicated. (6) Michele Sindona cooper-
ated in writing a book about his involvement in the collapse of several banks. Sindona was
poisoned in prison in 1986. This case is currently being adjudicated. Hevesi, supra note 41, at B8.
54. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the State's Son of Sam
law. Children of Bedford, Inc. v. Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 551 (N.Y. 1991). In this case, the
New York Crime Victims Board sought to escrow the royalties due to Jean Harris, the author of a
book entitled STRANGER IN Two WORLDS. Id. at 543. The book contained her "thoughts, feelings,
opinions, or emotions" regarding the killing of the famed "Scarsdale Diet" doctor, Herman
Tarnower. Id. (quoting N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(l)). The Court of Appeals, applying strict scru-
tiny, concluded that the New York law serves a compelling state interest. Id. at 549-50. Not only
does the statute compensate the victims of crime, it also advances the State's interest in not al-
lowing a criminal to profit from his own wrongdoing. The law was also held to be narrowly tai-
lored to meet this compelling interest because it only sought to regulate the receipt of money and
not the contents of the criminal's speech. Id. at 550. Furthermore, it does not necessarily result in
a complete forfeiture of the funds but only delays payment. Id. Moreover, the New York Son of
Sam law does not prevent others from publishing the criminal's story. Id. See also Fasching v.
Kallinger, 510 A.2d 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 546 A.2d 1094
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988). In Fasching, the state trial court upheld New Jersey's Son of
Sam law against First Amendment challenge from the author and publisher of a book about the
life and crimes of Joseph Kallinger. Id. at 704. The appellate division did not address the First
Amendment claims by the author and publisher because it held that the law did not reach their
respective profits. For procedural reasons, the appellate division also did not address the criminal's
First Amendment challenge either. Id. at 696. See generally FLORA SCHREIBER, THE SHOEMAKER:
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paths were taken, most commentators have concluded that the Son of
Sam laws violate the freedom of speech that the First Amendment
seeks to protect.55
The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that: "Congress
shall make no law .. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press." 56 Although the language of the First Amendment appears to
speak in absolute terms, the Supreme Court has never taken this
view.57 Rather, in determining the appropriate standard of review, the
THE ANATOMY OF A PSYCHOTIC (1983). Other cases have considered the nuances of the Son of
Sam laws but have not dealt with their First Amendment constitutionality. See, e.g., United
States v. MacDonald, 607 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (interpreting the federal Son of Sam
law, the plaintiffs First Amendment claim was not addressed because the court concluded that
the forfeiture provision was unconstitutional as an ex post facto law); In re Halmi, 12 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986), affid, 512 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (hold-
ing that New York's Son of Sam law does not reach victimless crimes); Barrett v. Wojtowicz, 414.
N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (examining the statute of limitation provision of the New
York law); In re Johnsen, 430 N.Y.S.2d 904 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (examining the appointments
of conservators under the New York "Son of Sam" law). In Johnsen, the court stated: "This court
declares Executive Law section 632-a constitutional .. " Id. at 909. However, the court reached
this conclusion without any analysis.
55. See, e.g., Comment, Alabama's Anti-Profit Statute: A Recent Trend in Victim Compen-
sation, 33 ALA. L. REV. 109 (1981); Gillard, supra note 39, at 180-88. But see Ecker & O'Brien,
supra note 4, at 1110.
56. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
57. Ecker & O'Brien, supra note 4, at 1082. A variety of standards have been used by the
Court in dealing with different types of speech protected by the First Amendment. First, when
dealing with political speech the Court has formulated such standards as: (1) the "clear and pre-
sent danger" test. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); (2) the "Learned Hand"
test. See Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); and (3) what is probably
the modern approach where the Court has combined the "clear and present danger" test and the
"Learned Hand" test. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). For a general discussion of
these varying standards, see WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 21 (1984). Second, when dealing with "Time, Place and Manner" restrictions the Court has
developed a three part test. In order for the restriction on speech to withstand constitutional scru-
tiny it must be content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and
leave open alternative channels of communication. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781 (1989). If the speech is deemed to be within the "public forum," the Court has typically
interpreted the second prong of this test more stringently. See Hague v. Committee of Ind. Org.,
307 U.S. 496 (1939). Third, when placing restrictions on non-verbal actions, the Court has ap-
plied a four prong test: (I) the restriction must be within the constitutional power of the govern-
ment; (2) it must further an important governmental interest; (3) the government's interest must
be unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the restriction must not be greater than
is necessary to serve the governmental interest. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968); see also infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. This is not an exhaustive list of the
various standards developed by the Court. However, it does illustrate the difficulty the Court has
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Court has distinguished between those restrictions that are content-
based 8 and those that are content-neutral. 9
To test the constitutionality of content-based speech, the Court has
generally started its analysis by deciding whether the restricted speech
is of "low" or "high" First Amendment value.6" The Court has recog-
nized four classes of speech that are not afforded First Amendment
protection. 1 Other speech receives only limited protection under the
First Amendment. 2 If the Court concludes that the speech is of "low"
had in adopting a standard for First Amendment analysis.
58. Content-based restrictions are those that "limit communication because of the message
conveyed." Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189, 190 (1983). See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976). In Virginia Pharmacy the Court invalidated a Virginia statute that prohibited pharma-
cists from advertising prescription drug prices. Id. at 770. The state maintained that it had an
interest in protecting the general public from lower quality goods which could result from compet-
itive pricing of drugs. Id. at 755. The statute was reviewed as a content-based restriction. Id. at
770-71. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). The defendant in Cohen was arrested
and convicted for wearing a jacket that displayed the words "Fuck the Draft." Id. at 16. He was
convicted under a statute that prohibited "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet
of any neighborhood or person .. .by . . .offensive conduct." Id. The Court concluded that the
statute was content-based. Id. at 26 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 415 (West 1988)).
59. Content-neutral restrictions are those that "limit communication without regard to the
message conveyed." Stone, supra note 58, at 189. See also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939). In Schneider, a city attempted to prohibit the distribution of leaflets. Id. at 148. The
Court concluded that this was a content-neutral restriction since the harm sought to be prevented
(littering) was independent of the content of the leaflets. Id. at 160. The development of the
content-based or content-neutral distinction will not be discussed in this note. For a general dis-
cussion, see Paul B. Stephan Ill, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L
REV. 203 (1982).
60. Stone, supra note 58, at 194. The "'low" value theory was first mentioned in the famous
dictum of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."). One commentator has referred
to this approach as the "defining out" approach. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First
Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 280-81 (1981). By "defining out,"
Schauer suggests that the Court begins by presuming that the First Amendment protects all
speech and then excludes speech that does not sufficiently further the purposes of the First
Amendment. Id. Applying this approach, the Court looks at several factors "including the relative
value of the speech and the risk of inadvertently chilling 'high' value expression." Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47 n.4 (1987).
61. The four classifications of speech that receive no First Amendment protection include:
(1) Advocacy of illegal conduct. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); (2) Fighting
words. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); (3) Obscenity. See Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); and (4) Child pornography. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747 (1982).
62. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
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First Amendment value, then it will apply the applicable standard to
that classification of speech.63
The area that has received the most attention is where the Court
concludes that the speech is of "high" value.64 Content-based restric-
tions of "high" value speech are strictly scrutinized by the Court and
are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored means 5 of serving
compelling state interests.66 This low value or high value distinction is
important because the Court has stated that the government's burden
to justify a statute subject to strict scrutiny "is well-nigh
insurmountable."6 7
Strict scrutiny was applied in Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland68 where the Supreme Court invalidated a tax scheme that ex-
empted sales of religious, professional, trade, and sports magazines, but
not general interest magazines.6 9 The Court noted that the magazine's
tax status was clearly dependent upon its content. 71 In order for a con-
(Commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection; however, that protection is less
extensive than for other types of speech).
63. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980) (stating that commercial speech may be suppressed if it is false or misleading, or if the
restriction directly advances a substantial governmental interest and is "not more extensive than is
necessary" to achieve that interest); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (stating that obscen-
ity may be suppressed whenever the government shows that some undemanding scienter require-
ment is met); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (stating that express excitement
may be suppressed only if it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action").
64. Stone, supra note 58, at 196. See supra note 60 and accompanying text for the analysis
the Court uses to determine whether restricted speech is of "low" or "high" First Amendment
value.
65. The Court considers less burdensome alternatives when determining whether a particu-
lar law is narrowly tailored. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S.
1, 19 (1986) (concluding that the state's interest can be served by a means that does not violate
the utilities' First Amendment rights).
66. See Stone, supra note 58, at 196-97. In order to receive the "compelling" label, a stat-
ute must meet two criteria. John T. Loss, Note, Criminals Selling Their Stories: The First
Amendment Requires Legislative Reexamination, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1331, 1340 (1987). First,
the state must show that it has a strong interest in the underlying policies of the statute. Id.
Second, the possible chilling effect of the statute must be sufficiently outweighed by the state's
interest. Id.
67. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988).
68. 481 U.S. 221 (1987). In this case, an Arkansas publisher sought a refund of state taxes
it had paid on sales of its magazine. The publisher challenged a state statute that taxed the sales
of its general interest magazine, but exempted sales of religious, professional, trade and sports
magazines. Id. at 224-25.
69. Id. at 234.
70. Id. at 229. The Court stated that: "Regulations which permit the Government to dis-
criminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amend-
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tent-based regulation to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the State
must show that the "regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'71 The Court ulti-
mately concluded that, standing alone, the State's interest in raising
revenue was an insufficient governmental interest. 2 Furthermore, the
Court concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored to achieve
the State's interest in encouraging "fledgling" publishers. 73
The Court reaffirmed the Arkansas Writers' analysis in Leathers
v. Medlock. 4 In Leathers, the Court found that a tax that extended to
cable television services but specifically exempted other media was not
an unconstitutional differential taxation. 75 The rationale behind this
holding was that the legislative intent was not to restrict speech based
upon its content.76 However, the Court recognized that a restriction
which was determined to be content-based would be presumptively in-
consistent with the First Amendment. 7 1 Since the Court concluded that
the tax was not content-based, it applied a much less stringent standard
of review.7"
Content-neutral restrictions differ from content-based restrictions
ment." Id. at 230 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984)).
71. Id. at 231.
72. Id. at 231-32. The Court concluded that the interest in raising revenue, "[s]tanding
alone, ...cannot justify the special treatment of the press, for an alternative means of achieving
the same interest without raising concerns under the First Amendment is clearly available: the
State could raise the revenue by taxing businesses generally, avoiding the censorial threat implicit
in a tax that singles out the press." Id. (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983)).
73. Id. at 232. The Commissioner argued that the statutory exemptions were "intended to
encourage 'fledgling' publishers, who have only limited audiences and therefore do not have access
to the same volume of advertising revenues as general interest magazines. Id. The Court seemed
to doubt whether this was a compelling state interest but nevertheless, concluded that the statute
was not narrowly tailored to achieve this objective. It was both underinclusive and overinclusive in
that it exempted magazines "regardless of whether they are 'fledgling'; even the most lucrative
and well-established religious, professional, trade, and sports journals do not pay sales tax." Id.
74. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991). This case involved a cable television subscriber, a cable opera-
tor, and a cable organization that challenged the extension of a state sales tax to cable television
services. Id. at 1441. The petitioners argued that the State of Arkansas' taxation of these cable
services when compared with the exclusions given to newspapers, magazines, and satellite broad-
cast services, violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. For an in-
depth discussion of this case, see John W. Campbell, Note, Constitutional
Law-Taxation-Intramedia Differential Tax Scheme Upheld, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J.
125 (1991).
75. Leathers, 111 S. Ct. at 1447.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1443-44.
78. ld. at 1444. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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in that they do not regulate speech based upon the content of the mes-
sage being conveyed.79 As such, the Court has adopted less stringent
standards of review to deal with their constitutionality.8" In United
States v. O'Brien8 the Court established a less demanding test to be
applied in situations where the burden on speech is only incidental.82 In
O'Brien, the Court took into consideration a law that prohibited the
destruction of draft cards.83 O'Brien claimed that the burning of his
draft card was in response to his dissatisfaction with the draft and the
Vietnam War.84 The Court concluded that the First Amendment is
aimed at protecting expressive conduct.85 However, strict scrutiny was
not applied because the Court found that the law was aimed at preserv-
ing the draft system and not at suppressing expression.86
The O'Brien analysis was subsequently applied in City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc." In City of Renton the Court upheld a city
zoning ordinance that prohibited adult movie theatres from being lo-
cated within 1,000 feet of residential areas or various public accommo-
dations.88 In this case, the Court concluded that the ordinance was
aimed at the secondary effects of adult movie theatres in these commu-
nities 89 and not at the content of the films that were shown. 90 The
79. Stone, supra note 60, at 48.
80. Stone, supra note 60, at 48. For a general discussion of the different standards of review
adopted by the Court for content-neutral analysis, see Stone, supra note 60, at 48-50.
81. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
82. Ecker & O'Brien, supra note 4, at 1084-85.
83. 391 U.S. at 369-70.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 376.
86. Id. at 376-77. According to the Court in O'Brien, incidental infringements on the First
Amendment can be justified by the state upon a showing that:
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
87. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
88. Id. at 54. The city zoning ordinance prohibited adult movie theatres from being located
within "1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or
school." Id. at 43. Theatre owners challenged this ordinance arguing that it impermissibly violated
their First Amendment rights in that it was aimed at suppressing the content of the films shown.
Id. at 47.
89. Id. at 47. The secondary effects that the ordinance intended to remedy included prevent-
ing "crime, protect[ing] the city's retail trade, maintain[ing] property values," and preserving the
quality of life within the community. Id. at 48.
90. Id. at 47. The Court rejected the holding by the Court of Appeals that "if 'a motivating
factor' in enacting the ordinance was to restrict respondents' exercise of First Amendment rights
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Court went on to find that the City had a sufficient interest in preserv-
ing the quality of life and that the City was not suppressing expression
because the ordinance allowed adult theatres to be built in certain des-
ignated areas.9 In fact, the Court noted that the City had set aside a
portion of land to be used for these adult theatres.
92
The traditional distinction between content-based and content-neu-
tral restrictions can sometimes be difficult to define.9 However, once
the Court concludes that speech is regulated based upon the content of
its message, it will apply a strict scrutiny standard of review. 94 If, on
the other hand, the Court concludes that the restriction on speech is
content-neutral, it will apply a much less stringent standard of review.95
III. REASONING OF THE COURT IN SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC.
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims
Board the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether New York's
Son of Sam law97 violated the First Amendment. The Court,9 8 in re-
versing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,99 concluded that the Son
of Sam law regulated speech based upon its content'00 and thus, the
the ordinance would be invalid." Id. The Court noted that this rationale was specifically rejected
in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968). The Court, quoting O'Brien, stated: "It
is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise
constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive .. ." City of Renton, 475
U.S. at 48. The Court went on to say that: "What motivates one legislator to make a speech about
a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are suffi-
ciently high for us to eschew guesswork." Id. (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383-84).
91. Id. The second prong of the O'Brien test requires that the government's interest be
unrelated to suppression of expression. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989).
92. City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-54. For a discussion of City of Renton's effect on
content classification, see Note, The Content Distinction In Free Speech Analysis After Renton,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (1989). The City of Renton holding was subsequently reaffirmed in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). For further discussions of content-
neutral restrictions, see Stone, supra note 60, at 48. See also Stone, supra note 58, at 196.
93. See generally Stone, supra note 58, at 189.
94. Stone, supra note 58, at 196.
95. Stone, supra note 60, at 48-50.
96. 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991).
97. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992).
98. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices White, Stevens, Scalia, and Souter joined. 112 S. Ct. at 504. Justices Blackmun and
Kennedy filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case. Id. at 512.
99. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Fischetti, 916 F.2d 777 (2nd Cir. 1990).
100. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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appropriate standard of review was strict scrutiny."' 1 Applying this
standard, the Court agreed that the State of New York had a compel-
ling interest "in compensating victims from the fruits of crime," but
the Court determined that the statute was not "narrowly tailored to
advance that objective." 10 Therefore, the Court concluded that the
statute was in violation of the First Amendment.'03
Relying upon Leathers v. Medlock'0 4 and Arkansas Writers' Pro-
ject, Inc. v. Ragland,'n5 the Court concluded that when a statute bur-
dens a person's speech based upon the content of that speech, a pre-
sumption is raised that the statute is inconsistent with the First
Amendment.' The Court voiced its concern that the Government, by
imposing content-based restrictions on speech, could ultimately prevent
certain ideas or viewpoints from ever reaching the "marketplace."'' 07
The Court concluded that New York's Son of Sam law was a content-
based statute because it singled out only the income from Hill's collab-
oration in publishing Wiseguy but no other income.'08 Furthermore, the
statute was only directed at the content of Hill's speech.' 09
The Court rejected the Board's attempt to distinguish the Son of
Sam law from the tax that was invalidated in Arkansas Writers'."10
The Board argued that the Son of Sam law was distinguishable be-
101. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the strict scrutiny standard of review.
102. Id. at 512.
103. Id.
104. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
105. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
106. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508. The Court cited Arkansas Writers', wherein it
concluded that "official scrutiny of the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is
entirely incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press." Id. (quot-
ing Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 230 (1987)).
107. Id. at 508. The marketplace-of-ideas model has been "long recognized in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence." Frederick Schauer, Comment, Speech and "Speech" - Obscenity. and "Ob-
scenity". An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEo. L. J. 899, 915
(1979). See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("purpose of First
Amendment is to preserve uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail").
108. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508.
109. Id. The Court stated that it was irrelevant whether the First Amendment speaker was
determined to be:
Henry Hill, whose income the statute places in escrow because of the story he has told,
or Simon & Schuster, which can publish books about crime with the assistance of only
those criminals willing to forgo remuneration for at least five years, [because] the stat-
ute plainly imposes a financial disincentive only on speech of a particular content.
Id.
110. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
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cause it escrowed the income for at least five years rather than taxing a
percentage of the writer's speech-derived income outright. "1 The Court
concluded that both situations "operate as disincentives to speak."11 2
The Board also attempted to persuade the Court that discrimina-
tory financial treatment does not run afoul of the First Amendment
unless the legislative intent was to suppress certain ideas. " The Court,
citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Reve-
nue" 4 and Arkansas Writers', concluded that suppressive legislative in-
tent is not necessary to invalidate a statute under the First
Amendment. "
The Court was equally unpersuaded by the Board's attempt to dif-
ferentiate the Son of Sam law from "content-based financial regulation
specifically of the media."'1 6 The Board argued that the Son of Sam
law was different because it covered any "entity" that attempted to
transmit the speech of a convicted person." 7 The Court concluded that
this argument failed on "both semantic and constitutional grounds."' 1 8
First, the Court noted that once an entity enters into a contract with a
convicted person, it "becomes by definition a medium of communica-
tion.""1 9 Secondly, the Court held that content-based disincentives on
speech are invalid regardless of whom the speaker is determined to
be.120 Citing Arkansas Writers', the Court ruled that in order to justify
a law that attempts to regulate speech based upon its content, "the
State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' ' 1
The Board conceded that it had no interest in protecting speech
111. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508.
112. Id. In fact, as the Court noted, "in many cases it will be impossible to discern in
advance which type of regulation will be more costly to the speaker." Id. at 509.
113. Id.
114. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
115. 112 S. Ct. at 509. Minneapolis Star was cited for the proposition that "[wie have long
recognized that even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the
exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment." Id. (quoting Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at
592).
116. 112 S. Ct. at 509.
117. Id. The Board attempted to analogize Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., Ill S. Ct. 2513
(1991), where the Court stated that "enforcement of ...general laws against the press is not
subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organi-
zations." Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 509 (quoting Cohen, Ill S. Ct. at 2518).
118. 112 S. Ct. at 509.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Arkansas Writers', 481 U.S. at 231).
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which it might consider to be offensive or disagreeable to the general
public.122 However, the Board maintained that the state did have a
compelling interest in compensating victims of crime, 123 as well as a
compelling state interest in ensuring that criminals do not profit
12
from the crimes they commit.' 26 The Court agreed that these were le-
gitimate state interests.' 6 However, the Court disagreed with the
Board's attempt to limit these interests to selective assets and activi-
ties. 1 27 Again relying on Arkansas Writers' and Minneapolis Star, the
Court reiterated its previous holdings that although a state certainly
has an interest in raising revenue through taxation, this interest is not
properly served by selective taxation of the press.' 21 Similarly, the
Court concluded that the state has a legitimate interest in compensat-
ing victims of crime, but that this interest- could hardly be justified by
limiting compensation solely "to the proceeds of the wrongdoer's speech
about the crime. '"29
The Court next addressed whether the Son of Sam law was nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the State's compelling interest in compensat-
122. 112 S. Ct. at 509. The Court stated that "[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Id. (quoting United States v. Eich-
man, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990)).
123. 112 S. Ct. at 509. The Court was primarily concerned with the possibility that
criminals might dissipate their assets before crime victims had a chance to recover. Id. at 509-10.
As the Court noted, this concern also serves to justify New York's "statutory provisions for pre-
judgment remedies and orders of restitution." Id. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 6201-6226
(McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27 (McKinney 1987).
124. The parties to this suit disagreed as to "whether book royalties can properly be termed
the profits of crime." 112 S. Ct. at 510. The Court chose not to address this issue and assumed,
for the purpose of this case, "that the income escrowed by the Son of Sam law represents the
fruits of crime." Id.
125. Id. The state's interest in ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes is also
evidenced by New York's "statutory provisions for the forfeiture of the proceeds and instrumen-
talities of crime." Id. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 1310-1352 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
126. 112 S. Ct. at 509-10.
127. Id. at 510. The Court was concerned by the fact that the Board could not explain
"why the State should have any greater interest in compensating victims from the proceeds of
such 'storytelling' than from any of the criminal's other assets." Id. Nor could the Board "offer
any justification for a distinction between this expressive activity and any other activity in connec-
tion with its interest in transferring the fruits of crime from criminals to their victims." Id.
128. Id. The Court was also persuaded by the holding in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980). In Carey the Court recognized the state's interest in preserving privacy by prohibiting
residential picketing, but could hardly see how prohibiting only nonlabor picketing served this
interest. Id. at 465.
129. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511.
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ing victims from the fruits of the crime. 130 Two provisions in the Son of
Sam law were determined to be "significantly overinclusive."' 13' First,
the law was found to be overinclusive in that it applied to all works
that expressed the criminal's "thoughts or recollections about his crime,
however tangentially or incidentally.' 32 Secondly, the statute defined a
convicted person to include any person that admits in his work to hav-
ing committed a crime regardless of whether that person is ever ac-
cused or convicted.' 33 Because the Court concluded that the statute was
overinclusive, it did not address the Board's position that the statute
was content-neutral.3 4 Citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism3 5 and
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,' 36 the Court found that even
under content-neutral analysis it is still necessary to show that the reg-
ulation on speech is narrowly tailored. 137 Likewise, the Court felt it
unnecessary to decide if the statute was also underinclusive as Justice
Blackmun suggested in his concurrence.' 38
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, agreed with the majority that
the Son of Sam law attempted to regulate speech based upon its con-
tent. 3 9 Kennedy argued, however, that once the determination is made
that the law is content-based, the inquiry should end and the speech
should be afforded the full protection of the First Amendment.' 4 The
test adopted by the majority, Kennedy argued, was derived from the
Court's Equal Protection analysis in Carey v. Brown'4' and has no
place in First Amendment jurisprudence. 42
130. Id. at 511-12.
131. Id. at 511.
132. Id. NY. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
133. 112 S. Ct. at 511. See N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 632-a(10)(b). To demonstrate the overinclu-
siveness of these provisions, the Court recites a list of authors whose literary works would have
been subject to § 632-a had it been in effect at the time of the writing. 112 S. Ct. at 511.
134. 112 S. Ct. at 511 & n.
135. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
136. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
137. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 511 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 and Renton, 475
U.S. at 52).
138. 112 S. Ct. at 511-12 & n.; see also id. at 512 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
139. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
140. Id.
141. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
142. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 512-13. Justice Kennedy cites a long list of cases
supporting the two-pronged test used by the majority. However, he eventually traces this test to
Carey where the Court stated that: "When government regulation discriminates among speech-
related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be
finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions
it draws must be carefully scrutinized." Id. at 513 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added)
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IV. ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE
The significance behind the decision in Simon & Schuster is two-
fold. First, it will be necessary for the states and the federal govern-
ment to re-evaluate the constitutionality of their Son of Sam legislation
in light of the decision in Simon & Schuster. Secondly, as Justice Ken-
nedy's concurrence suggests, the Court seems willing to allow the gov-
ernment to place content-based restrictions on speech provided these
restrictions are narrowly drawn means of serving compelling state
interests.'4
3
Most states and the federal government have enacted legislation
designed to remedy the same problems that confronted the State of
New York when it enacted section 632-a.' 44 The relevant Arkansas
statute contains some of the same provisions that were found to be un-
constitutional in Simon & Schuster.'45 As a result of the decision in
Simon & Schuster, the Arkansas statute may have constitutional
problems for two reasons. First, the Court found that New York's Son
of Sam law was overinclusive because it applied to "works on any sub-
ject, provided that they express the author's thoughts or recollections
about his crime, however tangentially or incidentally. '"I" Likewise, the
Arkansas statute appears to be overinclusive since it applies to reenact-
ments of a crime where the criminal expresses his "thoughts, opinions,
or emotions regarding the crime. '
Second, the Arkansas statute attempts to compensate crime vic-
tims from the proceeds of the criminal's speech about the crime but not
(quoting Carey, 447 U.S. at 461-62). Thus, as Kennedy argues, it appears as though the two-
pronged test used by the majority derived from the Equal Protection analysis and not from First
Amendment analysis.
143. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
145. The Arkansas Statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a)(1) Any person, referred to as the defendant in this section, who has been convicted
of, or has pled guilty or nolo contendere to, any crime, who contracts to re-enact the
crime by use of any book, motion picture, magazine article, radio or television presenta-
tion, live entertainment, or any live or recorded presentation, or from the expression of
his thoughts, opinions, or emotions regarding the crime, shall pay to the circuit court
wherein the charges were filed any money or thing of value contracted to be paid to the
defendant, his spouse, heirs, assigns, and transferees.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-308 (Michie 1987) (emphasis added).
146. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 511
(1991).
147. See supra note 145.
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from other assets of the criminal."' 8 For this reason, the Court found
that New York's interest was not compelling. Arkansas' statute may be
directly related to its interest in preventing criminals from profiting
from the crimes they commit. However, if Arkansas is truly interested
in compensating crime victims, the scope of the statute should be
broadened to include other assets of the criminal.
The Court's decision is also significant in that it allows the govern-
ment to place content-based restrictions on speech whenever it feels a
compelling justification to do so and the regulation is narrowly drawn
to meet the state's justification. This rationale runs contrary to a host
of cases which have concluded that states cannot restrict expression
"because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."' 19
In fact, as Justice Kennedy pointed out, the majority's test seems to
have reached First Amendment jurisprudence "by accident rather than
as a result of a considered judgment.' 150
Kennedy's approach to First Amendment analysis would do away
with the Court's need to balance the competing interests, and instead,
would focus on whether or not the restriction on speech is content-
based or content-neutral.' 5  On its face, this approach would seem to
provide some much needed consistency in First Amendment jurispru-
dence. The Court would no longer be confronted with the sometimes
subjective determination as to whether the statute in question serves a
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.
Rather, under Kennedy's approach, if the Court finds that a particular
restriction is content-based, the inquiry would end and the speech
would be afforded First Amendment protection.
Kennedy's analysis could also provide greater First Amendment
protection. Not even a compelling state interest would justify content-
based restrictions. This would be in accord with the majority's own
statement that content-based restrictions "cannot be tolerated under
148. See supra note 145.
149. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). In Mosely, the Court
stated: "above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Id. at 95. The
Court has also stated the broad principle that "[riegulations which permit the Government to
discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First
Amendment." Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508
(1991) (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc. 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984)).
150. 112 S. Ct. at 513 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151. Kennedy would still recognize that certain content-based speech is afforded little if no
protection. Id. at 514 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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the First Amendment.' 52
Kennedy's approach would not alleviate all the problems associ-
ated with deciding cases under the First Amendment. The Court would
still be confronted with having to initially determinewhether the re-
striction on speech is content-based or content-neutral. Furthermore,
even if the restriction is determined to be content-based, the Court will
still have to determine whether the speech falls within one of the lim-
ited or unprotected categories. 5 ' Although Kennedy's approach would
not eliminate all the subjective determinations of the Court, it does fall
in line with the Court's prior decisions prohibiting content-based
restrictions.154
William E. Lawrence
152. Simon & Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,
648-49 (1984)).
153. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited and un-
protected categories.
154. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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